Karisma Karisma is an Independent Researcher, Malaysia. Karisma previously served as an Assistant Professor at the Tunku Abdul Rahman University of Management and Technology. She is presently affiliated with Asia School of Business, Malaysia. Her research pursuits revolve around the intersection of law and technology, emphasising interdisciplinary and comparative perspectives. Specifically, she explores the applicability of artificial intelligence and blockchain technology in the energy sector, delving into the associated legal and regulatory dimensions. Dedicated and adaptable, she engages in interdisciplinary research and collaborative scholarly initiatives, prioritising the dissemination of knowledge and fostering collaborative initiatives grounded in mutual interest and reciprocity. Her commitment to excellence manifests in several high-quality research papers she has published and presentations she has delivered at international conferences.
Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway's posthumanist theory is a transformative paradigm that challenges the traditional notion of humans as stable, independent entities. Instead, they propose a dynamic perspective of humans as relational beings who are constantly influenced by interactions with politics, technology, the environment, and history. Hayles envisions the posthuman subject as a composite entity, fluid and diverse in its components. The cyborg, a concept that blurs the lines between human and nonhuman, organic and artificial, is introduced by Haraway. Our perceptions are challenged and our curiosity piqued by the existence of this machine-organ hybrid in both fiction and social reality. By rejecting the idea of humans as unified, autonomous, and self-contained, posthumanist thought necessitates a reevaluation of legal frameworks, which emphasises that technology is more than just a tool for the outside world; rather, it is a part of the ever-evolving relationships between humans, animals, and machines.
This perspective presents humans as relational; hybrid beings co-produced with technological systems. If humans are already entangled with the nonhuman world ecologically, emotionally, and technologically, then legal frameworks based on rigid human-centred boundaries become inadequate. Legal systems treat technology as a neutral instrument, but posthumanism challenges this view. These systems still assume a human-nonhuman divide that posthumanism has questioned. The blurring of boundaries in the posthuman world necessitates a rethinking of legal frameworks. The current frameworks are ill-equipped to handle the complexity and interconnectedness of this new reality. The posthumanist legal subject demands a radical reimagining of legal information in its content, form, function, and knowledge base.
In what may soon cease to be speculative fiction, one might imagine a reality where legal information becomes a biocomputational interface, embedded in neural chips, synthetic minds, and planetary governance systems. Normative boundaries are sensed, cognitively internalised, and enacted by the posthuman subject to adapt their behaviour. Such boundaries are what we refer to as 'embedded legal consciousness', a concept that suggests that the subject (the posthuman in this regard) has internalised law, turning it from external regulation into behavioural cognition, which is precisely where H.L.A. Hart's concept of the "internal point of view" acquires renewed relevance. By this understanding, posthuman subjects do not merely follow or consult rules externally (from fear or coercion); they inhabit and adapt them through embedded legal-awareness modules, demonstrating functional acceptance.
In posthuman jurisprudence, agency, normativity, and interpretation are no longer confined to human realms. Legal reasoning transcends 'human' cognition, becoming a function of distributed, adaptive intelligences. Law is no longer restricted to text but is embedded in code, sensors, and networks, executed and interpreted in real time by recursive, affective systems. Legal judgment does not stem from individual human deliberation, but from collective, post-anthropocentric cognition.
This position aligns with Dworkin's framework of judges as epistemic agents, but extends it to nonhuman, composite, and hybrid intelligences. This shift redefines law as a co-evolving epistemic architecture, where meaning is modulated across hybrid posthuman agents. Recognising the fluidity of personhood expands the scope of legal information, allowing it to encompass emerging techno-social actors. Legal precedent evolves as a dynamically reweighted structure, responsive to ecological, social, and algorithmic landscapes.